In this paper we consider mixed oligopoly markets for di®erentiated goods where private and public¯rms compete either in prices or quantities. We then study the welfare e®ect of privatization interpreted as partial strategic delegation of the public¯rm to a private manager with pro¯t concern. It is shown that partial privatization improves welfare with quantity competition when goods are substitutes, and with price competition when goods are complements. However full privatization (complete delegation to private manager) can never be optimal. It is also shown that the public¯rm can make more pro¯t than the private¯rm in equilibrium, and that this possibility is more likely under quantity competition. Turning to market regulation policy, we¯nd: (i) that public and private¯rms should be taxed the same; and (ii) that price regulation is better than quantity regulation.
Introduction
The literature on mixed oligopoly assumes the competition between privatē rms and public¯rms. Private¯rms maximize pro¯ts and public¯rms maximize welfare. The key issue is the welfare e®ect of privatization. De Fraja and Delbono (1989) consider n private¯rms competing with one public¯rm producing homogenous goods with the same technology involving a¯xed cost and increasing marginal costs (and no capacity constraint). Under Cournot{Nash competition and provided that the market is su±ciently competitive (n exceeds some threshold), they show that welfare is improved if the public¯rm maximizes pro¯t instead of welfare. This is a strong argument for privatization when markets are su±ciently competitive. Cremer et al. (1989) allow for the possibility that cost is higher in public¯rms (with constant marginal costs and identical xed costs). Starting from a market where all¯rms are private, they study the welfare e®ect of transferring¯rms into public ownership (i.e. nationalization) instructing them to maximize welfare sub ject to break even condition. In the short run the¯xed cost is sunk and private¯rms would stay active even if they make negative pro¯ts in equilibrium, but in the long run such¯rms would exit the market. They show that in the short run it is optimal to have only one public¯rm (irrespective of the¯xed cost) if the extra cost from public¯rm production is not too high. In the long run, nationalization of one¯rm drives out the remaining¯rms and leads to a public monopoly, which is dominated by a private monopoly due to the cost di®erence.
Our purpose in this paper is to extend the analysis of privatization and taxation of mixed oligopoly in two important directions. The¯rst contribution is to allow for partial privatization. Indeed, the common feature of most of the existing work on mixed oligopoly is to assume that the public¯rms care only about welfare. However in many countries, public¯rms are partially privatized, which implies they also care about pro¯t. A natural way to formalize this, is to assume that the public¯rm maximizes a (convex) combination of welfare and pro¯t, and to represent the extent of privatization as the weight the public¯rms put on pro¯ts.
Di®erent approaches have been taken for modelling non-pro¯t behavior. In Fershtman (1990) , the reaction function is assumed to be a combination of the purely pro¯t maximizing and the purely welfare maximizing reaction functions. This is an assumption on endogeneous variable which is di®erent form our assumption on the primitive that the objective function is a convex combination of pro¯t and welfare.
1 Fershtman (1990) is also interested by di®erent issues which are relative pro¯t-performance, and entry deterrence. In particular, he shows that non-pro¯t maximizing¯rms make more pro¯t than pro¯t-maximizing¯rms and that non-pro¯t maximizing¯rms can reduce entry on the market. There is also some related work on strategic delegation by¯rm owners. Fershtman and Judd (1987) who study how the owners can strategically manipulate the incentive schemes of their managers to a®ect the oligopoly out-come. They show that there may be value to the owners of distorting their managers' incentive away from pro¯t maximization, even though the owners care only about pro¯ts. In a two stage Cournot game where the owners¯rst set the incentives for their managers and the managers then compete in quantities, the equilibrium involves twisting the managers away from pro¯t maximization by providing incentives for sales (over-compensation). The reason is that maximizing sales revenue instead of pro¯t makes the seller a more agressive competitor which changes the equilibrium outcome in the Cournot-quantity game, since each manager will react to the incentives given to competing managers. The distortion from pro¯t maximization is reversed when managers compete in price. To encourage managers to set a high price, owners will pay managers to keep sales low (under-compensation). Sklivas (1987) shows that delegation is always a dominant strategy but that in equilibrium with delegation and optimal managerial incentives, pro¯ts can be either increased or decreased, relative to no delegation, depending on whether¯rms compete in prices or quantities. This is because the simultaneous delegation involves incentive contracts with sales premium in the Cournot game which strenghtens competition and lowers¯rm pro¯ts. In the same vein, Brander and Lewis (1986) show that a¯rm's owners may strategically manipulate the capital structure to alter their incentives and competitors' behavior. By issuing extra debt, the possibility of bankruptcy leads the manager to act more agressively. In the Cournot competition equilibrium all¯rms are worse o®, even though it is a dominant strategy for each of them to strategically issue extra debt. Showalter (1995) shows that in a Bertrand competition equilibrium¯rms are better o® with this strategy so that we can predict debt levels to be associated with higher pro¯ts as evidence suggests.
Our modelling of partial privatization is closely related to Matsumura (1998) who shows that either pure welfare maximization or pure pro¯t maximation by the public¯rm are harmful in a mixed Cournot duopoly with homogeneous goods. This result relies on the assumption that private¯rms remain active in equilibrium (as in Cremer et al., 1989 ). Our purpose is to explicitly allow the public¯rm to price out the market the private¯rms, and to determine the optimal degree of privatization as a function of the cost advantage of the privatē rms. The second contribution of this paper is to allow for di®erentiated markets. Most of the existing work on mixed oligopoly and strategic delegation assumes all¯rms sell an homogenous product. 2 We relax this assumption and consider a mixed duopoly in a symetrically di®erentiated market µ a la Shubik. We then compare privatization under price and quantity competition when goods are either complements or substitutes. 3 Our main result is a duality result of partial 2 The few exceptions are Cremer et al (1991) on mixed oligopoly and Fershtman and Judd (1985) on strategic delegation. 3 Cremer et al (1991) is rather di®erent and more ambitious. They use a spatial competition model of product di®erentiation µ a la Hotelling to study the joint e®ect of a public¯rm on price competition and product selection (location choices). Demand is inelastic and total welfare is equal to total transportation costs. In the case of a duopoly, one public¯rm is bene¯cial for welfare (it induces the e±cient locational con¯guration). However in a triopoly, the public privatization. Partial privatization is optimal with Cournot competition when the goods are substitutes and, it is optimal with Bertrand competition when the goods are complements. We also show that full privatization is never optimal no matter what the type of competition is and whether goods are substitutes or complements.
Turning to the tax incidence, some mixed oligopoly models investigate the e®ect of taxes and subsidies on such markets. The main result is that the¯rst-best can be restored with optimal subsidies that are independent of ownership structure and whether the game is simultaneous or the public¯rm is a Stackelberg leader. This tax non-discrimination result has been obtained for a mixed oligopoly with one public¯rm concerned only with welfare and n private¯rms producing an homogeneous good. 4 Our purpose is to extend this tax analysis of mixed markets to the more general setting where public¯rms care both about pro¯t and welfare. It is shown that the optimal taxes are independent of the weights the public¯rms put on welfare and pro¯t. This is shown to be true for general cost functions (with possibly di®erent costs between public and private¯rms), homogeneous or di®erentiated goods and Cournot or Stackelberg competition.
The alternative to tax regulation mechanism is the marginal cost pricing rule. Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) argue that marginal cost pricing is akin to the public¯rm acting as the Stackelberg follower. 5 In a duopolistic industry with one private and one public¯rms, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) show that if the public¯rm is the Stackelberg leader, welfare is improved over the CournotNash equilibrium outcome. With public leadership, Harris and Wiens (1980) argue that the¯rst-best outcome could be achieved if the public¯rm announces that it will make up any di®erence between the e±cient output and the private output. However such commitment is hardly credible since it can impose losses on the public¯rm for some private output levels. Reversing the leadership, Beato and MasColell (1984) show that in many cases, the follower position of the public rm implies marginal cost pricing and is welfare superior to the leader position. The idea is that the equilibrium is characterized by a bias towards excessive public production: price is larger than private marginal cost. It follows that welfare increases if private production increases which is often the case when the private¯rm is the leader. To obtain this result, Beato and MasColell (1984) assume a pure public¯rm (with no pro¯t concern) and constant but di®erent marginal cost between public and private¯rms. We show that with identical cost functions and pure public¯rm, the welfare is the same under public or private leadership. However private leadership is strictly better when the public rm is also partly interested in pro¯t (partial privatization).
rm is harmful (it induces a more ine±cient locational con¯guration from the two privatē rms: they locate too closely to the public¯rm which is less agressive in pricing). 4 The irrelevance result has¯rst been obtained by White (1996) for speci¯c demand and cost functions and then extended to progressively more general cost and demand functions by Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and Myles (2002) . 5 When the public¯rms maximizes welfare, the marginal cost pricing rule is the public reaction function to every private production. When the public¯rm is a leader, its decision rule assigns a constant public production to any private production.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The welfare analysis of privatization is examined in Section 2 for homogeneous goods and in section 3 for di®erentiated goods. The issue of optimal tax regulation is studied in Section 4. Section 5 demonstrates the welfare superiority of price regulation over quantity regulation. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Privatization with Homogeneous Goods

Identical technology
We¯rst consider the very simple setting of a public and private¯rms producing the same output with identical and constant marginal cost c > 0. Public production is denoted x 0 and private production is denoted x 1 . We assume linear inverse demand P (X) = ® ¡¯X where X = x 0 + x 1 is the industry output, ® > c, and¯> 0. Given this simple environment we can explicitely calculate the equilibrium outcome and make the welfare analysis of a change in ownership structure. We will next verify the robustness of the result. The pro¯t levels are
The industry-wide welfare is
The objective of the public¯rm is
The output levels solve the¯rst-order conditions
The reactions functions are respectively 6 In Fershtman (1990) the public¯rm is assumed to have a reaction function that is a convex combination of the reaction function of a welfare maximizing¯rm and a pro¯t maximizinḡ rm. However it is easily seen in our model that maximizing a combination of welfare and pro¯t is not equivalent to a combination of the reaction functions.
and the Nash equilibrium output levels
So increasing µ increases the market share of the public¯rm. This is because the public¯rm's concern for welfare serves as a credible commitment to increase output beyond the pro¯t-maximizing level. Since public production is larger than private production x 0 > x 1 , it follows also that the public¯rm is more pro¯table than the private¯rm ¼ 0 > ¼ 1 although the public¯rm is not a pro¯t maximizer. The aggregate output is
which is increasing in µ and so the equilibrium price is decreasing in µ. Thus, the aggregate output is increasing with µ and equals the welfare maximizing output when µ = 1. This is because when the public¯rm is concerned only with welfare, it prices out of the market the private¯rm (i.e. x 1 = 0 for µ = 1) and acts as a monopolist maximizing welfare. 7 Now consider the case µ < 1. Let Á(µ) = (2 ¡ µ)=(3 ¡ 2µ) < 1 then the industry output is X = Á(µ)(® ¡ c)=¯which is less than the socially optimal level of output X ¤ = (® ¡ c)=¯(solving the marginal cost pricing rule P (X) = c). The level of welfare is increasing in µ and so privatization cannot be optimal.
The natural question in such analysis is whether the capacity of the public rm to restore the¯rst-best is not speci¯c to the duopolistic model. Consider for example that the public¯rm competes with n¸2 identical private¯rms. Calculating the equilibrium quantities in this mixed oligopoly gives
We ignore capacity constraint.
Thus again the private¯rms are all priced out the market by the single public rm when µ = 1 (i.e. nx 1 = 0) and the¯rst-best is restored. It is also immediate to see that the welfare is an increasing function of µ. It is enough to have a singlē rm which cares only about welfare to restore the socially optimal outcome in this oligopoly industry. The advantage of this solution is that it does not require information about cost and demand functions (such as price regulation would require). The bottom line is that privatization is unambiguously bad for welfare in a symmetric and non-di®erentiated industry.
Of course this story is incomplete: if we allow for increasing marginal costs then the opposite result that social welfare is increased when the public¯rm maximizes pro¯t may hold. That point was¯rst made by De Fraja and Delbono (1989). They provide a numerical example showing that, in some circumstances and when¯rms have an identical technology exhibiting increasing marginal costs, social welfare can be increased by instructing the public¯rm to maximize its own pro¯t. That result has a paradoxical°avour. Nevertheless, it nds a clear explanation in the countervailing e®ects of privatization. Privatization in an oligopolistic market reduces allocative e±ciency: it creates oligopoly rents and, consequently, results in lower output and higher prices. However, under reasonable circumstances, privatization also enhances productive e±ciency even with identical technologies. Indeed, if¯rms face identical and increasing marginal costs, productive e±ciency requires that production be equally split among them. But, in a mixed oligopoly, there is excessive public production and so the public¯rm operates at higher marginal cost than the private¯rms. Therefore, privatization is optimal whenever the gains in terms of productive efciency outweight the losses in terms of allocative e±ciency. Moreover, the more competitive the market { the larger the number of competitors { the more likely are the productive gains from privatization to dominate its allocative e±ciency costs.
In this paper, we believe that the binary choice between either no privatization or full privatization is a bit extreme. It is also counterfactual. We allow instead for the possibility of partial privatization which is likely to dominate either the full privatization or no privatization solutions. In fact, we now extend the welfare analysis to allow for cost asymmetries in order to show that when¯rms operate di®erent technologies: (a) no privatization cannot be optimal when the public¯rm su®ers a cost-disadvantage relative to its private competitors and(b) cost asymetries have to be excessively high to make full privatization optimal.
Di®erent technology
If¯rms have unequal production cost such that the private¯rm is more e±cient, then the overall welfare e®ect of privatization consists of two con°icting e®ects: the cost of reducing industry output and the gain from shifting production to more e±cient private¯rms. Using the linear duopoly model discussed previously we can evaluate the optimal degree of privatization. Let c be the constant marginal cost of the private¯rm, and consider that the public¯rm is less e±-cient with a constant marginal cost of (1 + ¹)c where ¹¸0 is the cost markup of public¯rm. Calculating reaction functions in the linear duopolistic industry gives
olving to get equilibrium quantities
hus removing any pro¯t maximizing concern from the public¯rm does not price out the private¯rm: x 1 = ¹c=¯for µ = 1. Plugging the equilibrium outcome into the welfare function
Calculating the welfare maximizing level of µ yields
Not surprisingly partial privatization is always good for welfare and the optimal degree of privatization increases with the relative e±ciency of private¯rms. However this relative e±ciency has to be excessively high to make complete privatization optimal: in fact µ ¤ = 0 when ¹¸(® ¡ c) =5c, (see Matsumura, 1998, for similar result).
Privatization with Di®erentiated Goods
We now introduce a taste for variety, so that the trade o® involved with privatization is between the cost of lower industry output and the gain arising from greater variety (think of our previous case where the public production crowds out the private production). We will see how the conclusion about the optimal privatization depends on wheher goods are susbtitutes or complements, and on whether¯rms compete in prices or quantities.
We consider a di®erentiated products duopoly with constant marginal cost normalized to zero c = 0. Following Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984) , we assume that the representative consumer's preferences are described by the following quadratic utility function
yielding the following (direct and inverse) demand systems:
x i = a ¡ bp i + dp j ; i 6 = j;
We assume that ® > 0,¯> 0 and¯> ±. These assumptions ensure that U is strictly concave. The parameters of the inverse demand (13) are related to the parameters of the direct demand (14) as follows:
For positive, zero or negative ± values, the goods are respectively substitutes, independent or complements. Let°= ±=¯denote the degree of product di®er-entiation varying from 0 for independent goods to 1 for perfect substitutes or complements. Furthermore the assumption of¯> ± implies that the own-price e®ect dominates the cross-price e®ect. We consider two di®erent forms of competition: Under Cournot-Nash competition, players choose output levels as strategies and in a Bertrand-Nash game, they choose prices as strategies. In both cases, the timing of the game is as follows: in the¯rst stage, the social planner decides on the degree of privatization µ. In the second stage, both¯rms compete on the market. We look for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the proposed game.
Our analysis takes advantage of the formal duality that relates Cournot's and Bertrand's models of oligopoly.
8 Duality follows straightforwardly from the following observations. First, expressions of private¯rms' pro¯ts under quantity and price competition are respectively given by
and ¼ i (p i ; p j ) = (a ¡ bp i + dp j )p i ; 8i; j 2 f0; 1g:
8 That duality was¯rst noticed by Sonnenschein (1968) in a non-di®erentiated market. He observed that complementary monopoly equilibrium outcome can be obtained from Cournot equilibrium outcome by merely changing variables, and conversely. This observation was subsequently extended to di®erentiated products markets by Singh and Vives (1984) . In this case, Cournot (Bertrand) competition with substitutes (± > 0) was shown to be the dual of Bertrand (Cournot) competition with complements (± < 0).
It can be noticed that we can obtain one expression from the other by identifying x i with p i , ® with a and ± with ¡d.
Second, the public¯rm's objective function under quantity and price competition can be rewritten so as to exibit a similar symmetry. Note that social welfare, when considered as a function of quantities, can be written in the following formŴ
where ¹ = ® and ³ = 0. Now, let us express social welfare as a function of prices. Plugging the direct demand functions x 0 (p 0 ; p 1 ) and x 1 (p 0 ; p 1 ) into (18) and rearranging, we get,
where´= 0 and » = ® 2 =(¯+ ±). Therefore, objective functions of the partially privatized¯rm under Cournot and Bertrand competition can be respectively written as follows:
Thus quantity optimization problem is the dual of the price optimization problem given the permutation of parameters.
In the quantity competition model, the private¯rm maximizes ¼ i (x i ; x j ) and the public¯rm maximizesV (x 0 ; x 1 ) whereas, in the price competition model, the private¯rm maximizes ¼ i (p i ; p j ) and the public¯rm maximizesV (p 0 ; p 1 ). In what follows, we will exploit this duality between the two games.
Quantity Competition
We now solve for quantity competition. The private¯rm takes x 0 as given and chooses x 1 so as to maximize ¼ 1 (x 1 ; x 0 ) whereas the public¯rm takes x 1 as given and chooses x 0 so as to maximizeV (x 0 ; x 1 ). The¯rst-order conditions (@¼ 1 =@x 1 = 0 and @V =@x 0 = 0) yield the following reaction functions :
Solving the system of best responses (24a) and (24b) gives the equilibrium quantities:
and replacing ¹ = ® in equilibrium quantities, we obtain:
The equilibrium quantity di®erence is
and from (13) the equilibrium price di®erence is
The public¯rm produces more and prices less in equilibrium than the privatē rm. Comparing pro¯t levels gives 
As one can easily see, this might be true only if the goods are substitutes (± > 0), otherwise the private¯rm makes more pro¯t when goods are complements (± < 0). We now solve for the optimal degree of privatization. Plugging equilibrium output levels intoŴ (x 0 ; x 1 ) and maximizing with respect to µ gives the optimal degree of privatization
Therefore partial privatization is optimal (µ ¤ c < 1) only if goods are substitutes ± > 0:
Price competition
It is usual that a change in the strategic variable may reverse the result (see Fershtman and Judd, 1987 ). So we check the welfare e®ect of privatization if rms sell di®erentiated products and compete in price. In this case, the privatē rm takes p 0 as given and chooses p 1 so as to maximize ¼ 1 (p 1 ; p 0 ) whereas the public¯rm takes p 1 as given and chooses p 0 so as to maximizeV (p 0 ; p 1 ). Reaction functions can be derived by direct application of the duality principle. Bertrand's reaction functions can be obtained from Cournot's reaction functions (24a) and (24b) by identifying x 0 with p 0 , ® with a, ± with ¡d,¯with b and ¹ with´. It comes that
Applying the duality principle we can also get the Bertrand equilibrium from the Cournot equilibrium outcome (25) and (26). That is
Since´= 0 , we obtain
The equilibrium price di®erence is
and from (14) the equilibrium quantity di®erence is
Thus the public¯rm produces more and and prices less in equilibrium than the private¯rm. Comparing pro¯t levels gives 
This inequality can only hold if goods are substitutes ± > 0; otherwise privatē rm makes more pro¯t in equilibrium. Comparing public¯rm performance with quantity competition we get the following result.
Proposition 1 In a symmetrically di®erentiated market with quantity competition, the public¯rm always makes less pro¯t than the private¯rm when goods are complements. When goods are substitutes there exist thresholds on the public rm concern for welfare 0 < µ c < µ b < 1 such that the public¯rm makes higher pro¯t:
(i) under quantity competition, if and only if µ < µ c (ii) under price competition, if and only if µ < µ b
We now solve for the optimal degree of privatization. SinceŴ (x (15), the optimal extent of privatization in the Bertrand case is given by
Comparing this result with the optimal extent of privatization under quantity competition we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider a symmetrically di®erentiated market. Then full privatization (µ = 0) is never optimal. Furthermore, partial privatization is optimal (i) under quantity competition, if and only if the goods are substitutes; (ii) under price competition, if and only if the goods are complements.
The main intuition is the following. Public¯rm cares about welfare and so produces more and prices less in equilibrium irrespective of whether¯rms competes in prices or quantities. Now suppose goods are (imperfect) substitutes. Under quantity competition privatization leads the public¯rm to produce less and because there is strategic substitutability in quantities it will lead the private¯rm to produce more. Without privatization, the public¯rm produces so as to maximize welfare and the private¯rm under produce (strategic substitutability) with a price in excess of marginal cost. Given this excessive public production, reducing public production has only a second-order e®ect on welfare while the induced increase in private production has a¯rst-order e®ect. Hence, welfare is improved with partial privatization. However under price competition, privatization leads the public¯rm to price more and because there is strategic complementarity in prices, the private¯rm will also price more so that, overall, privatization is harmful with lower supply and higher prices.
Non-Discrimination in Taxes
In this section we show that optimal tax regulation should not discriminate between private and public¯rms. In fact optimal taxes are independent of the public¯rm's concern for welfare, even though such a concern brings the equilibrium closer to the socially optimal outcome.We make this point¯rst with identical technology between public and private¯rms, then with di®erent technologies and lastly with sequential move between private and public¯rms.
Equal cost
The general case assumes decreasing inverse demand P (x) and increasing convex cost C(x). Identical cost functions is still assumed (we relax this assumption later). It follows that total cost in the industry is minimized when all¯rms have equal market shares (so as to equate marginal costs). So it cannot be socially optimal to have the public¯rm producing more than the private in equilibrium. Intuition would suggest that public and private¯rms should therefore be taxed di®erently because they have di®erent incentive to produce. We now show that it is mistaken.
The level of welfare is
The objective of¯rm 0 is
For¯rm 1
The¯rst best solves max fx0;x1 g
The two necessary conditions for this are
Subtract the¯rst from the second to give
, where X ¤ is the¯rst-best output de¯ned by
so price is equal to marginal cost. To decentralize this e±cient outcome, we must satisfy the two¯rst-order conditions for the¯rms that reduce to
which yields
which remains independent of µ: Thus the same tax rates decentralize the socially optimal outcome in a mixed oligopoly irrespective of the weight the public rm put on social welfare. How far can we generalize this independence result? we consider in turn (i) di®erent cost functions and (ii) stackelberg leadership.
Di®erent costs
The neutrality result is readily extended to di®erent cost functions. Let C i (x i ) be the (convex and increasing) cost function of¯rm i = 0; 1: So the public¯rm can be either more or less performant than the private¯rm. In this case, the socially optimal solution again requires two things (i) equating marginal costs; (ii) price equal to marginal cost. So the¯rst-best solution is characterized by a pair (¸¤; X ¤ ) solving the system of equations
To decentralize this optimal outcome, we must satisfy the two¯rst-order conditions for the¯rms that, given marginal cost pricing, reduce to
where x 0 =¸¤X ¤ and x 1 = (1 ¡¸¤)X ¤ which yields
which is determined entirely by the inverse demand and cost functions and so it remains independent of µ:
Stackelberg
Suppose public leadership. The optimization problem of the public¯rm takes into account the response function of the private¯rm. The best response function x 1 = r 1 (x 0 ) is implicitely de¯ned by the¯rst-order condition of¯rm 1
Under strategic substitutability the response function is downward sloping
Hence the¯rst-order condition of the public leader is
The optimal tax must induce the¯rst-best of P (X) = C 0 (x 0 ) = C 0 (x 1 ) and hence the¯rst-order conditions of¯rms reduces to
gives optimal tax rates
Since the optimal allocation (x ¤ 0 ; x ¤ 1 ) is determined entirely by the demand and cost functions, and the reaction function dx 1 =dx 0 is¯xed at the optimal outcome, the optimal taxes are again independent of µ:
Price versus Quantity Regulation
The Nash solution is the outcome where the private¯rm maximizes pro¯t given public prodution and the public¯rm maximizes welfare given private production. The resulting outcome is characterized by excessive public production. It would therefore be better in terms of welfare, to depart from this decision rule for the public¯rm and to adjust public production downwards in order to induce a favorable increase in private production. The issue is whether the public rm should then act as the leader or the follower. This question is important for market regulation because public follower is akin to price regulation since the marginal cost pricing rule is the public reaction function to every private production. When the public¯rm is a leader, it is equivalent to quantity regulation since its decision rule assigns a¯xed public production to private production choice. Using the linear model in Section 2 with homogeneous goods, we can explicitely solve the stackelberg model when either the public or the privatē rm is the leader. In the linear model the socially optimal aggregate supply is X ¤ = (® ¡ c) =¯.
Quantity Regulation
The reaction function of the private¯rm is
The Stackelberg equilibrium outcome is
where X ¤ = (® ¡ c) =¯is the socially optimal industry output. Note that equilibrium outcome converges to the¯rst-best when µ = 1:
Price Regulation
Reversing the role of the two¯rms, the reaction function of the public¯rm is
The stackelberg equilibrium outcome is
So aggregate output is higher with private leadership if r 0 (
It is easily seen that this inequality is strictly satis¯ed for all 0 < µ < 1 and weakly satis¯ed for µ = f0; 1g. Hence in a mixed oligopoly it is better to have the private¯rm acting as the leader: it leads to higher output and lower price. The order of moves does not matter when the public¯rm is concerned only either with pro¯t (µ = 0) or with welfare (µ = 1).
Proposition 3
If the public and private¯rms produce homogeneous goods with the same constant marginal cost and no capacity limit, (i) welfare is the same with quantity and price regulation when the public rm has no pro¯t concern (no privatization).
(ii) price regulation dominates when the public¯rm also cares about pro¯t (partial privatization)
This shows that the independence result relative to the roles of the two¯rms in Myles (2002) , Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and White (1996) is restricted to the speci¯c case where the public¯rm is concerned only with welfare (part i of the Proposition). The superiority of private leadership comes from the bias in mixed markets towards excessive public production. Departing from the marginal cost pricing rule by cutting public production induces favorable increase in private production. This is possible by allowing public¯rms to care also about pro¯t (partial privatization). Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) get similar dominance of price regulation with pure public¯rm by assuming di®erent cost functions.
Conclusion
In this paper we have been interested to look at the interaction between the form of delegation and the competition on di®erentiated markets. Since Schelling (1960) economists know that delegation can be used as a commitment device. By delegating decisions to agents with di®erent preferences from one's own, one can make threats credible that were not invividually rational to carry out if oneself would act. Some authors have incorporated this argument into an industrial organization context where¯rm owners can delegate decision to a manager and alter her incentive contract to make her act more agressively (see e.g. Vickers(1985) , Fershtman (1985) , Fershmant and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) ). They have shown that it can be a dominant strategy for¯rm owners to delegate production and price decisions to a manager and to distort managerial incentive away from pro¯t maximization by o®ering either negative (with price competition) or positive (with quantity competition) premium on sales.
The analysis in this paper argues that, in a mixed and di®erentiated market where public¯rms compete with private¯rms, privatization of the public¯rm by strategically delegating some of its decisions to a pro¯t-oriented manager can be welfare improving in certain circumstances. We also show that such partial privatization can sometimes lead the public¯rm to make higher pro¯ts than the private¯rms. Turning to tax policy on mixed markets, we derive a nondiscrimination principle that optimal regulation involves taxing the same the public¯rms regardless of the extent of delegation of the public¯rm to private managers. Moreover public and private¯rms should be taxed the same. Lastly we¯nd that price regulation is better than quantity regulation in terms of social welfare.
